









Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?
Abstract.  Jonathan Weisberg claims that, in an interesting class of cases, probability assessments constructed by strict or Jeffrey conditioning preclude subsequent revision by after-the-fact defeaters of the reasons supporting those assessments, and that conditioning is thus “inherently anti-holistic.”  His analysis founders, however, in applying Jeffrey conditioning to a partition for which an essential rigidity condition clearly fails. Applied to an appropriate partition, Jeffrey conditioning is amenable to revision by after-the-fact defeaters in precisely the way that Weisberg demands.
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1. Holism Lost.  Confirmational holism requires that a belief’s empirical justification be sensitive to background belief. For Bayesian epistemology this entails among other things that your probability assessments be amenable to revision in response to the discovery of after-the-fact defeaters of reasons supporting those assessments. Jonathan Weisberg (2009) thinks that, in an interesting class of cases, probability assessments constructed by conditioning preclude such revision, and that conditioning is thus “inherently anti-holistic.”  Typifying such cases is, he claims, the following  example:  Suppose that E asserts that a certain jelly bean is red, and F asserts that the lighting under which you are to view this jelly bean is contrived to make it appear red, whether it is or not. Let p be your prior probability measure on the algebra generated by E and F, and suppose that 
(1)       0 < p(E), p(F) < 1. 
One can easily imagine scenarios in which
(2)       p(EF) = p(E)p(F),
and Weisberg postulates this independence condition. Let q denote your revision of p in response to viewing the jelly bean and having the non-doxastic experience “as of red,” denoted E. This experience is assumed to increase your confidence in E, so that
(3)    q(E) > p(E),
 and to justify the rigidity conditions
(4)    q(F|E) = p(F|E),  and 
(5)    q(F|Ec) = p(F|Ec),    
 whence q comes from p by Jeffrey conditioning (JC) on the partition {E, Ec}.1
You now discover that the contrived lighting was in effect during your viewing, and so you revise q to r by strict conditioning on F. Since F is an after-the-fact defeater of your (non-doxastic) reason for becoming more confident in E, one would hope that
(6)    q(E|F) = p(E),
or, at the very least, that
(7)    q(E|F) <  q(E).
But this cannot be the case, for conditions (2), (4), (5), and (7) are incompatible. In particular, 
THEOREM 1.  Conditions (2), (4), and (5) together imply that   q(E|F) = q(E).
Proof.  See Weisberg (2009, p. 807).  
Moral: In failing to accommodate discovery of the after-the-fact defeater F, Jeffrey conditioning fails to respect confirmational holism.
2. Holism Regained.  But wait.  Consider the following variant elaboration of the incompatibility of conditions (2), (4), (5), and (7):
THEOREM 2.  Conditions (2), (4), and (7) together imply that q(F|Ec) > p(F|Ec).
Proof.  By (7), E and F are q-negatively relevant to each other, and so Ec and F are q-positively relevant to each other. So q(F|Ec) > q(F|E) = p(F|E) = p(F|Ec), the latter two equalities following, respectively, from (4) and (2). 
Condition (2) holds by design, (4) seems unexceptionable, and (7) expresses the minimally acceptable effect of discovering the defeater F. And the consequence of these three conditions, that q(F|Ec) > p(F|Ec), seems eminently reasonable. After all, if you’ve experienced E, and have subsequently learned that the jelly bean in question is not red, shouldn’t you become much more confident that the contrived lighting was in effect during your viewing, maybe even to the extent of setting q(F|Ec) = 1?  Clearly, the rigidity condition (5) is not a reasonable assumption, and so revising p by JC on {E, Ec} in response to E is unjustified. 
What revision q* of p would be justified?  Since either E or F makes it more likely that you will experience E, experiencing  E should lead you to set 
(9)     q*(EF) > p(EF).
Indeed, if you have good reason to believe that you could not have experienced E unless the jelly bean were red or the lighting contrived, you might go so far as to set q*(EF) = 1. But let us suppose that the viewing scenario is such that you might experience E even when viewing a non-red jelly bean under non-contrived lighting. Perhaps, for example, the lighting is dim, though not tinted red, and there are purple jelly beans among those from which the one you viewed was selected.  Then, along with (9), you might reasonably set 
(10)    q*(EcFc) > 0.
If (as would be reasonable under many ways of elaborating the scenario under consideration) nothing about E would prompt you to alter the prior odds between any of the three ways         (viz., EF, EcF, or EFc) in which EF might materialize, you would then be justified 2 in extending q* to the entire algebra A generated by E and F in accordance with Jeffrey’s Rule :
(11)     For all AA,   q*(A) = q*(EF)p(A| EF) + q*(EcFc)p(A| EcFc) . 
THEOREM 3.   The propositions E and F are q*- negatively relevant to each other.
Proof.  By (11), (2), and (9), q*(E|F) = p(E)  and q*(E) = q*(EF)p(E)/p(EF) > p(E). 
If we were to follow Weisberg’s development here, we would assume that you now discover that the contrived lighting was in effect during your viewing, leading you to update q* by strict conditioning on F. But we might as well treat the more general case in which you simply become more confident in F, and in such a way that you are not inclined to change the q*-odds between EF and EcF,  or between  EFc and EcFc. You would then be justified in updating q* to                (let us call it) r* by JC on the partition {F, Fc}, where
(12)         r*(F) > q*(F).
THEOREM 4.  The revision r* satisfies the minimally acceptable defeater inequality             r*(E) < q*(E). Moreover, r*(E) = p(E) if and only if r*(F) = 1.
Proof.   By JC and the total probability law,
 (13)         r*(E) – q*(E) = [r*(F) – q*(F)][q*(E|F) – q*(E|Fc)] < 0,
the first factor on the right hand side of (13) being positive by (12), and the second factor being negative by Theorem 3.  If r*(F) = 1, then r*(E) = q*(E|F) = p(E), as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.  Suppose that r*(E) = p(E) .  Then since r* comes from q* by JC on {F, Fc},       q*(E|F) = r*(E) = r*(F)q*(E|F) + r*(Fc)q*(E|Fc), and so r*(Fc)(q*(E|F) –  q*(E|Fc)) = 0. Hence r*(Fc) = 0, since  q*(E|F) –  q*(E|Fc) 0 by Theorem 3.  
It is easy to see that if q* comes from p by strict conditioning on EF, rather than by JC on     {EF, EcFc}, then Theorems 3 and 4 continue to hold.3 Thus either sort of conditioning results in a posterior q* amenable to revision based on an after-the-fact increase in confidence in the defeater F, and with exactly the properties that Weisberg demands. And the final probability q*(E) of E reverts all the way back to its initial value p(E) in just those scenarios in which you attain after-the-fact certainty regarding  F. 
Notes
1.  Note that (4) and (5) imply that q(A|E) = p(A|E) and q(A|Ec) = p(A|Ec) for every event A in the algebra generated by E and F, the latter  being the usually cited necessary and sufficient condition for q to come from p by JC on {E, Ec}. 
2. This odds rigidity is equivalent to the more familiar conditional probability rigidity criterion for updating by JC.  See Jeffrey (1992, p.125), noting that there is only one way for the event EcFc to materialize.
3. Whether one considers strict conditioning here as a separate case, or as a special case of JC, is more or less a matter of taste, depending on one’s tolerance for setting q*(EcFc)p(A| EcFc) = 0 when q*(EcFc) =0, notwithstanding the fact that p(A| EcFc) is undefined. 
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